

Achieving Strategic Overwatch

Considering the UK Proposal

This briefing is classified

SECRET

Derived from: Multiple sources

DECL ON: X1



The UK Proposal Clarifications to "Key Judgments"

- MNF-I presence is one unifying factor fueling the insurgency
 - Recent experience suggests that this is less a factor than previously complementary actions in response to Samarra and Fallujah are not significant, nor were they in Ramadan (to date)
- MNF-I envisages an enduring MNF presence ... nature TBD
 - Assessment of options for Forward Operating Sites and continued security cooperation are being addressed; not enduring presence
- Longer term presence in its current form
 - Current assessment, and the UK proposal suggests that eviction is highly unlikely
- Policy should be for the MNF-I to withdraw from Iraq in its present form on expiry of its current UN mandate
 - MNF-I planning recognizes the requirements of UNSCR 1546
- Unequivocal statement of intent ... could be advantageous ... manner and timing needs the closest consideration
 - Polling and intelligence does not provide reasonable assurance that a withdrawal announcement would positively influence Sunni election participation or dissuade the Iraqi population from supporting or ignoring insurgent activity

The outcome of the JAN 05 Election will drive force posture decisions



The UK Proposal "Key Judgments"



MNF-I presence is one unifying factor fueling the insurgency

- MNF-I envisages an enduring MNF presence . . . nature TBD
- Longer term presence in its current form:
 - Require a new UNSCR or IG invitation
 - Would continue to fuel the insurgency
 - Significantly weaken Coalition cohesion and public support
 - Lay the US and Coalition open to humiliating eviction
- By invitation presence for bilateral or multilateral assistance:
 - May have a less unifying effect on the insurgency
 - May be more regionally and domestically acceptable
- Policy should be for the MNF-I to withdraw from Iraq in its present form on expiry of its current UN mandate
- Unequivocal statement of intent ... could be advantageous ... manner and timing needs the closest consideration
 - Perceptions will be key
 - Must commit maximum synchronized effort ... during 2005
- If MNF-I does not make clear its intentions . . . may become more prone to early eviction by the ITG [Iraqi Transitional Government] . . . [although] unlikely in 05.

Proposal mischaracterizes MNF-I position and has missed changes to the Security Situation



Announcing Withdrawal Facts

- Iraqi public opinion is negative towards Coalition forces; ambivalent on our deaths, but also on our departure
- With an average 400 attacks per week, the insurgency has achieved a foundation
- FRE exploits nationalist and Islamist issues to hide their past
- previously indicated that opposition to MNF-I reinforces insurgency
 - However, recent experience suggests that this is less a factor complementary actions in response to Samarra and Fallujah are not significant, nor were they in Ramadan (to date)
- UK success in Malaya assisted by an analogous act (national election)
 - Malayans could be loyal to constitutional government rather than insurgents . . Took hold over several years



Possible January 05 Election Outcomes

- Key Variables:
 - Proportion of Sunni Arab, Shia Arab and Kurds in population
 - Percentage of Sunnis that vote
 - Shia support for moderate and religious candidates
- National Coalition: Most likely, least dangerous outcome
 - Combination of moderate Sunni and Shia, Kurds and religious Shia; similar to IIG
 - FRE led Sunni violence continues; Shia violence possible if religious Shia influence diminished (Da'wa and SCIRI)
- Kurd-Religious Partnership: Less likely, less dangerous outcome
 - Kurds collaborate with religious Shia to gain autonomy guarantees in exchange for Shia religious rule elsewhere
 - Sunni insurgents and FRE may coalesce into a Sunni movement
- Shia Dominated Government: Least likely, most dangerous outcome
 - Shia unity achieves controlling majority
 - Sunni and FRE coalesce into Sunni movement; and Kurds move towards secession
 - High probability of inter-ethnic, inter-religious violence

The insurgency continues, escalation very likely in the latter two

(b)(3), (b)(6)	MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp
-rom:	Sargeant, Stephen T. (O-8) (b)(6)
Cc:	Casey George GEN MNF-I CG; Casey George GEN MNF-I CG Weber Joseph F MajGen MNF-I COS; Weber Joseph F MajGen MNF-I COS; b 3 b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(4) Embassey Annex; (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I CG Aide-de-Camp; b 3, b 6) (O-4) Embassey Annex; (b)(3), (b)(6) MNF-I Secretary of the Joint/Combined Staff; b 3, (b)(6) (0-6); b 3, (b)(6)
Subject:	FW: Iraq Forces Plan (SECRET)
Classification: SECRET	**
Boss Gen Sharp called paper and had pas feedback on the s	Boss Gen Sharp called last night and said he had prepared slides to lead the discussion on the UK paper and had passed them to the CJCS as well as you and Gen Abizaid. He was seeking feedback on the slides and is ready to change them or defer to you and your slides if you wan
Attached below is our addresses the current r	Attached below is our proposed briefing as you requested, talking points, a State cable that addresses the current political situation.
Recommend you them to Gen Shar	Recommend you review our slides and either use them to lead the discussion or have us send them to Gen Sharp to use in modifying his presentation based on the comments below.
'R	C
Stephen T. Sargeant Major General, USAF	geant USAF
Deputy Chief of	f Staff, Strategy, Plans and Assessment
	(b)(6)
Original Message	
ht: Wednesday, November 1 Sargeant, Stephen T. (0-8)	0, 2004 12:53 AM
Subject: FW: Irag Forces Plan (S	[(O-5); (b)(3), (b)(6) [O-6) rces Plan (SECRET)

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:
1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff Declassified on: 201506

-Original Message-

Sent From:

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Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS J5
Tuesday, November 09, 2004 8:00 AM
Tuesday, November 09, 2004 8:00 AM
Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS J5; Myers, Richard B, Gen, CJCS; 'CENTCOM (GEN John Abizaid) (E-mail); 'MNF-I CG (GEN George Casey) (E-mail)'
Casey) (E-mail)': Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS; b B CIV, JCS OCICS; b 3), (b)(6) JCS J5
OCICS: b 3, b 6 Dep EA CJCS; b 3, (b)(6) JCS J5; b 3, (b)(6) JCS J5

Subject: RE: Iraq Forces Plan

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Attachment Classification: SECRET-Attachment Caveatis: NONE
Classification: SECRET-Caveatis: NONE
Caveatis: NONE would be appreciated. to Miami. I will send you changes as we make them. Your thoughts on these slides or whether you want to even use them Attached is the "40%" brief to tee up drawdown discussion at Wednesday's SVTC. The CJCS is reviewing these enroute

Pages 9 through 10 redacted for the following reasons: 1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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