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Achieving Strategic Overwatch

Considering the UK Proposal

This briefing is classified

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Derived from: Multiple sources
DECL ON: X1

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The UK Proposal Clarifications to "Key Judgments"

- MNF-I presence is one unifying factor fueling the insurgency
 - Recent experience suggests that this is less a factor than previously—complementary actions in response to Samarra and Fallujah are not significant, nor were they in Ramadan (to date)
- MNF-I envisages an enduring MNF presence . . . nature TBD
 - Assessment of options for Forward Operating Sites and continued security cooperation are being addressed; not enduring presence
- Longer term presence in its current form . . .
 - Current assessment, and the UK proposal suggests that eviction is highly unlikely
- Policy should be for the MNF-I to withdraw from Iraq in its present form on expiry of its current UN mandate
 - MNF-I planning recognizes the requirements of UNSCR 1546
- Unequivocal statement of intent . . . could be advantageous . . . manner and timing needs the closest consideration
 - Polling and intelligence does not provide reasonable assurance that a withdrawal announcement would positively influence Sunni election participation or dissuade the Iraqi population from supporting or ignoring insurgent activity

The outcome of the JAN 05 Election will drive force posture decisions

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The UK Proposal “Key Judgments”

- MNF-I presence is one unifying factor fueling the insurgency
- MNF-I envisages an enduring MNF presence . . . nature TBD
- Longer term presence in its current form:
 - Require a new UNSCR or IG invitation
 - Would continue to fuel the insurgency
 - Significantly weaken Coalition cohesion and public support
 - Lay the US and Coalition open to humiliating eviction
- By invitation presence for bilateral or multilateral assistance:
 - May have a less unifying effect on the insurgency
 - May be more regionally and domestically acceptable
- Policy should be for the MNF-I to withdraw from Iraq in its present form on expiry of its current UN mandate
- Unequivocal statement of intent . . . could be advantageous . . . manner and timing needs the closest consideration
 - Perceptions will be key
 - Must commit maximum synchronized effort . . . during 2005
- If MNF-I does not make clear its intentions . . . may become more prone to early eviction by the ITG [Iraqi Transitional Government] . . . [although] unlikely in 05.

Proposal mischaracterizes MNF-I position and has missed changes to the Security Situation

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Announcing Withdrawal Facts

- Iraqi public opinion is negative towards Coalition forces; ambivalent on our deaths, but also on our departure
- With an average 400 attacks per week, the insurgency has achieved a foundation
- FRE exploits nationalist and Islamist issues to hide their past
- 1.4c previously indicated that opposition to MNF-I reinforces insurgency
 - However, recent experience suggests that this is less a factor—complementary actions in response to Samarra and Fallujah are not significant, nor were they in Ramadan (to date)
- UK success in Malaya assisted by an analogous act (national election)
 - Malaysians could be loyal to constitutional government rather than insurgents . . . Took hold over several years

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Possible January 05 Election Outcomes

- **Key Variables:**
 - Proportion of Sunni Arab, Shia Arab and Kurds in population
 - Percentage of Sunnis that vote
 - Shia support for moderate and religious candidates
- **National Coalition:** Most likely, least dangerous outcome
 - Combination of moderate Sunni and Shia, Kurds and religious Shia; similar to IIG
 - FRE led Sunni violence continues; Shia violence possible if religious Shia influence diminished (Da'wa and SCIRI)
- **Kurd-Religious Partnership:** Less likely, less dangerous outcome
 - Kurds collaborate with religious Shia to gain autonomy guarantees in exchange for Shia religious rule elsewhere
 - Sunni insurgents and FRE may coalesce into a Sunni movement
- **Shia Dominated Government:** Least likely, most dangerous outcome
 - Shia unity achieves controlling majority
 - Sunni and FRE coalesce into Sunni movement; and Kurds move towards secession
 - High probability of inter-ethnic, inter-religious violence

The insurgency continues, escalation very likely in the latter two

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:

1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(6)

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-----Original Message-----

From: Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS J5
Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 2004 8:00 AM
To: Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS J5; Myers, Richard B, Gen, CJCS; 'CENTCOM (GEN John Abizaid) (E-mail)'; 'MNF-I CG (GEN George Casey) (E-mail)'
Cc: 'Peter Pace (E-mail)'; Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS; [] b 6 [] CIV, JCS OCJCS; [] b 3, (b)(6) [] JCS OCJCS; [] b 3, b 6 [] Dep EA CJCS; [] b 3, (b)(6) [] JCS J5; [] b 3, (b)(6) [] JCS J5
Subject: RE: Iraq Forces Plan

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

Sir,

Attached is the "40%" brief to tee up drawdown discussion at Wednesday's SVTC. The CJCS is reviewing these enroute to Miami. I will send you changes as we make them. Your thoughts on these slides or whether you want to even use them would be appreciated.

VR
Skip



drawdown.ppt (782 KB)

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Attachment Caveats: NONE
Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: NONE

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Pages 9 through 10 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4b, 1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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